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International Institutional Performance in Crisis
David Zaring*

The globalfinandal crisis was a challenge to three of the mostpromisin, and seemingl effective,
institutions of internationallaw-the World Trade Organization, the InternationalMonetary Fund,
and the internationalnetwork of regulatory agencies-andit was a challenge they failed to meet. This
Article reviews the pepformance of these three institutions in the aftermath of the financial shocks of
2007-08 andfinds that they had little to say in response. Those responses that wereforthcoming were
either ineffective or counterproductive, and only the IMF has emergedfrom the crisis with its potential
burnished. The record appears to vindicate the critics of these internationalinstitutionsand illustrate the

primay ofpolitics in internationalcrisis response. That primag has been exempliied by the importance
of the G20 in coordinating an internationalresponse to the crisis. The G20 is neither law-based nor
governance-focused, but can best be characterizedas a modern-day Concert of Europe, which appears to
be quite unconstrainedby law, and is not a regulatory network.

I. INTRODUCTION
What can the global financial crisis tell us about the institutions of
international governance? Because the legal versions of those institutions best
positioned to respond to the crisis-economic treaties, financial regulatory
networks, and the species of international organizations known as international
financial institutions-have been ineffective or, at best, marginally useful, critics
are likely to raise the age-old charge against international law: that they do not
matter. This charge will likely be leveled by those that either do not believe in
large swaths of international law, such as the international relations realists in
political science departments and their sympathizers in law schools,' or those
*

Assistant Professor, Wharton School of Business. Thanks to David Abrams, Robert Ahdieh,
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See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of InternationalPolitics 88 (Addison Wesley 1979)
(stating that "[i]nternational systems are decentralized and anarchic"); John J.Mearsheimer, A
Realist Re/py, 20 Ind Security 82, 82 (1995) ("Realists ...believe that institutions cannot get states
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who believe that legal institutions in general fare poorly in emergencies, as2 Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule have argued in a different, domestic context.
The increasingly global production of administrative law has often been
thought to offer a response to critics like these, as international administration
has appeared in a number of different guises, all of which have contributed their
share of oversight to the increasingly interlinked world economy. The World
Trade Organization (WTO), a formal treaty, has overseen and encouraged that
inter-linkage by enforcing the reduction of trade barriers through a process of
adjudication. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
evolved into standalone providers of development aid, which they have, at least
until recently, conditioned on adoption of the "Washington Consensus" on
market reform. Perhaps most promisingly, regulators increasingly cooperate with
one another. Domestic agencies have turned abroad for the formulation of
critical policies, which has been seen to be a victory for international governance
and possibly a way forward for a broadly defined view of international law itself.
The initial failure of these administrative institutions is a challenge for
internationally minded lawyers. It suggests that the variety of international
administrative institutions can fairly be critiqued on their contribution to the
legalization of international relations. That legalization, it turns out, has been
limited.
Would-be defenders of the potential of these institutions must turn to the
less happily quantifiable contributions of the relationships created by networks,
treaties, and international organizations as the foundations of political
cooperation. Unfortunately, claims that earlier cooperation in other areas of
governance ineffably augmented the international cooperation resulting from the
3
crisis verge on the unfalsifiable.
In this Article, I begin by making clear how unhappy international lawyers
should be with the performance of their institutions so far, and then propose

2

3

to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers ....
I]nstitutional outcomes invariably reflect
the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent effects
on state behavior.'); Hans J. Morgenthau, PoliicsAmong Naions: The Struggle for Power and Peace 415 (Knopf 1973) (describing the tenets of realism).
Consider Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the AdministraiveState: 9/11 and
the Financial Meltdown of 2008, U Chi Public Law Working Paper No 248, online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1301164 (visited Nov 21, 2009) (discussing
the inability of the legislature and the courts to respond to emergency situations and having to
delegate broad power to the executive branch).
For the importance of falsifiability, see Karl Popper, The Logic of Sdentific Discovegy 40-43
(Hutchinson 1959) (discussing the importance of falsifiability and empirical verification in
determining a theory's validity). For a popular treatment of Popper's theories, see David
Edmonds, Wittgenstein's Poker (Ecco 2001) (interspersing brief descriptions of Dr. Karl Popper's
theories in a biographical text of Popper and Professor Ludwig Wittgenstein).
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ways to evaluate the contributions of those institutions more systematically. In
my view, the record of these institutions illustrates the importance of the
internalization of compliance by states and other international actors through
these cooperative institutions. It may also indicate that these institutions, which
have been siloed apart from one another in particular issue areas, need the sort
of inter-linkage that organizations like the G20 can provide. The G20's
prominence in the present crisis illustrates the likelihood that the regulatory
solutions adopted will be tinged more with politics than with regulatory expertise
and technocratic know-how. It also suggests the primacy of politics in
international cooperation-at least when it comes to a crisis-for the G20 is not
a legal or technocratic institution at all; it is a modern-day Concert of Europe.
Few would have expected in 2007 that a large-scale institutional failure of
global administrative law was in the cards. After all, the last four decades had
been good ones for international economic regulators. The GATT was
embraced during this period and its administrative functions were expanded, and
in 1994, the WTO treaty was ratified by most of the large world economies. In
1974, networks of banking supervisors and securities regulations were founded,
and the network form of global regulation has expanded ever since.
International financial institutions, although they were founded in the Bretton
Woods meeting after the Second World War, developed strengths in the last
thirty years through project finance and development work. They were also
tasked with implementing the Washington Consensus on the value of free
markets and lightly regulated domestic industries.
International economic law, in short, looked like law with bite. It was not
customary international law, which to this day has critics who doubt its breadth
and effectiveness. 4 It had no claim to the regulation of high politics and national
security, where international instruments regulating the use of force and human
rights have been subject to a number of serious critiques. 5
Instead, countries great and small have honored their trade obligations, and
submitted themselves to the judgment of the WTO. 6 On other critical matters of
4

5

6

See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customay InternationalLaw as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815, 817 (1997) (critiquing the
position that customary international law now constitutes federal common law).
See, for example, Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L J 1935,
1942 (2002) (suggesting that human rights treaties may be both ineffective and even
counterproductive); Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Arlide 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force by States, 64 Am J Intl L 809, 835 (1970) (suggesting that blinkered views of national
interest have seriously damaged Article 2(4)).
See, for example, Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:An Overview of the
First Three Years, 8 Minn J Global Trade 1, 16 (1999) ("[T]he volume of cases during the first three
years of the WTO disputes procedure is almost 90 percent greater than the highest volume ever
achieved by the GATT disputes procedure.").
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prosperity, wealthy countries, for better or worse, have been able to coordinate
their interests more easily through a variety of international economic legal and
semi-legal entities than, say, all of the member nations who actively participate in
the UN General Assembly.
But all of this changed during the financial crisis, and the implications for
regulation are notable. First, traditional international legal instrumentsespecially the WTO-are, if they are doing anything at all, preventing
governments from responding to the crisis in the way they might prefer. The
trade treaty makes two responses by governments-bailouts of banks and auto
companies and economic stimuli with a "buy local" requirement attached-look
inconsistent with the treaty, at best, and serve as signs that treaty discipline
7
disappears in emergencies, at worst.
Second, international networks, such as the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), have not been the loci of any serious response to the crisis. Networks
are a form of international governance that many people, including me, had held
out as particularly promising and actually effective,8 and financial networks had
long been thought to be especially so. 9 The failure of Basel, IOSCO, and their
ilk to do anything to respond to the crisis, and their leaving response
coordination to the G20, a political organization, is sobering.
Third, the IMF, unlike the WTO and the networks, has done its bit to
respond to the crisis. The IMF, recently in decline and staffed at half its former
strength, has provided liquidity to collapsing developing countries (and
Iceland)."0 It has been the announced recipient of a large and apparently real
7

See Section III; see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Global FinancialCrisis and Its Impact on World
Trade and the World Economy, 41 UCC LJ 375, § III.D, IILL, III.M (2009) (suggesting that both
buy local requirements and bailouts of domestic institutions may run afoul of WTO agreements).
The WTO is not the only treaty implicated by the crisis, of course, but it is the most prominent
one, and, in my view, a good example of the forces at work on treaty observance. For a view that
it is the investment treaties that will present the real check on government action in response to
the financial crisis, see Posner and Vermeule, Crisis Governance (cited in note 2).

8

See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Zaring, Networking Goes International An
Update, 2 Ann Rev of L and Soc Sci 21, 218-20 (2006) (discussing other authors' views of the
effectiveness of networks and how to enhance that effectiveness). Consider Daniel C. Esty, Good
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizng Administrative Law, 115 Yale LJ 1490 (2006)
(considering how to make governance institutions like networks responsive, finding them
promising).

9

Consider David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in InternationalLaw, 46 Colum J Transnal L
563, 576-79 (2008) (explaining some of the benefits to international norm creation through
networks and looking at examples of cooperation via networks in financial regulation).
Matthew Saltmarsh, A Push to Free CapitalforEmerging Markets, NY Times (Feb 5, 2009), online at

10

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/business/worldbusiness/O5euro.html
(visited Nov 21,
2009) (mentioning how the IMF lends money to Iceland, Eastern European nations, and possibly
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infusion of $750 billion by the members of the G20. n But its contribution-as a
conduit through which wealthy countries bail out poor ones-simply
underscores how much the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have
become development agencies, rather than sources of global governance and
lenders of last resort for the powerful and powerless alike. Moreover, the World
Bank (or, for that matter, the UN) has not matched the IMF's contributions.
In what follows, I explore the contributions of networks, the WTO, and
the IMF in greater detail. I then turn to the G20, which is the new institutional
focus of the global effort to respond to the crisis. And I evaluate what this effort
means for administrative law, which, in either its harder treaty form or softer
network form, has given way to governance through politics.
II. NETWORKS
Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote that international networks exhibit "pattern[s]
of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across
the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the
'domestic' from the 'international' sphere .... ,012 In the early years of network
analysis, scholars-including myself-were impressed at how widespread and
vibrant this tool of international governance appeared to be. 13 Networks of
regulatory agencies (and not foreign relations diplomats) were popping up
everywhere, not only in financial regulation, but also in transportation, antitrust,
and other areas where there were global spillovers and externalities but no
organized global response. These agencies promised technical and apolitical
coordination that, in many ways, was more achievable than that offered by
multilateral treaties or great power summits.
Moreover, these international networks, which began as ways to organize
financial and other sorts of regulators of like mind but with little attentiveness to
procedure, have often evolved into something that increasingly requires notice,
comment, and opportunity to respond. A remarkable example of this lies in the
contrast between the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy (establishing the
minimum levels of capital that banks supervised by members of the committee

11

to other developing countries); Ulrich Volz, Sovereign Debt Risk Looms Large This Year, Wall St J
A13 (an 30, 2009) (stating that the IMF has extended and may continue to extend credit to
various nations).
Group of Twenty ("G20"), Declaration on Deliveing Resources throegh the International Financial

12

Institutions - London, 2 April 2009, 1 (G20 2009), online at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
FinDepsIFIAnnexDraft_02_04_09 - l615_Clean.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order14 (Princeton 2004) (defining networks).

13

Consider David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
FinancialRegulatory Organizations,33 Tex Intl L J 281 (1998).
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had to hold on hand in their reserves), which was concluded in secret by the
Basel Committee in 1988 and released in a twelve-page document, and the
second Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), which was put through five years' worth
of comments by hundreds of interested individuals and institutions and resulted
in a correspondingly long and detailed regulatory product. 4 1OSCO has similarly
opened its deliberations to this sort of ventilation by interested and affected
parties; so have other networks. The resulting process in these cases is one that
would be familiar to American lawyers accustomed to domestic rulemaking.
For example, consider the evolution of the Basel Committee. Prompted by
three large international bank failures in 1974,15 the central bank governors of
the Group of Ten Countries (G10), along with Luxembourg, agreed to establish
the Basel Committee (Committee) that year.' 6 The members declared, via a press
release, that the primary purpose of the Committee would be to provide its
members with a regular forum for airing cooperative approaches to the
supervision of multinational banks. 17 Since its founding, the Committee,
pursuant to this mandate, has served both as the venue for the exchange of
information about supervisory practices and as the mechanism for the
promulgation of hard standards to which all members of the committee must
subscribe. It rotates its chairmanship and operates through consensus." The

15

David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in InternationalAdministration, 5 Chi J Intl L 547,
572-80 (2005) (describing the enactment of the two Basel Capital Accords).
On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced Bank Herstatt into liquidation. This left without

16

remedy a number of banks that had released payment of marks to Herstatt in Frankfurt in
exchange for dollars that were to be delivered in New York. See Risk Glossary, Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, online at http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/baslecommittee.htm (visited
Nov 21, 2009). British-Israel Bank, based in the UK, and Franklin National Bank, based in the
US, also failed. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Supervising InternationalBanks: Onigins and Implications of the
Basel Accord 4-5 (Princeton 1991) (discussing the history surrounding the establishment of the
Basel Committee).
The Committee's original members came from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

17

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. See Bank for
International Settlements ("BIS"), Histogy of the Basel Committee and its Membership, online at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009); Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View From Basel, 17 Eur J Intl L 15, 16 (2006)
(describing the creation of the Basel Committee).
See BIS, Press Communiqui 1 (Feb 12, 1975) ("The committee is designed to assist the Governors

14

in their continuing work of surveillance and exchange of information."); Joseph J. Norton, Trends

in InternationalBank Supervision and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 48 Consumer Fin L Q

18

415, 415 n 1 (1994) (stating that the founding mandate for the Committee is found in the Feb 12,
1975 press release).
Joseph J. Norton, PrivatiZation of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Callfor International
Standards, 64 Brooklyn L Rev 817, 857 (1998) (mentioning that the Basel Committee's uses of
consensus methods has had some positive results); Tony Porter, States, Markets, and Regimes in
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Committee has held a number of comment periods for matters related to the
revision of its capital accord, which it concluded could "be helpful to the
Committee as it makes the final modifications to its proposal for a new capital
adequacy framework."' 9
IOSCO is another example. A network regulator for the securities markets,
it developed in 1984 out of the Interamerican Association of Securities
Commissions and Similar Agencies. The members of that body passed bylaws
transforming it from a regional group founded a decade earlier (again, to deal
with problems of international systemic risk and enforcement loopholes) into a
global collection of securities regulators.2" IOSCO started as a private bill in the
Quebec provincial legislature, and since then it has developed bylaws under
which its members have agreed to cooperate together to "establish standards
and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions" and to
"provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a rigorous
application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses."'"
IOSCO is a much less selective organization than the Basel Committee-it
claims 174 members, overseeing almost all of the world's capital markets.
However, in other matters of form, the two organizations are very similar. As
with the Basel Committee, IOSCO operates on an informal structure, its
pronouncements do not rise to the level of law, and it practices internal opacity.
Also, like the Basel Committee, IOSCO now provides a lot of material on its
website and has opened itself up for comment. In 2002, for example, it issued

19

Global Finance 66-67 (St Martin's Press 1993) (stating that while the process of the Basel
Committee is clouded in secrecy, it does rely on consensus).
See BIS, Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord-Third Consultative Paper (Apr 2003), online at

20

http://www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009); see also BIS, Press Release-Update
on the New Basel CapitalAccord (June 25, 2001), online at http://www.bis.org/press/p010625.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009) ("The Committee intends to continue promoting an open dialogue as its
work continues and believes that such efforts will help to ensure that the new Accord meets its
objectives.").
See Paul Guy, Regulatory Harmonization to Achieve Effective International Competition, in Franklin R.

21

22

Edwards and Hugh T. Patrick, eds, Regulating InternationalFinancialMarkets: Issues and Poliies291,
291 (1992) (describing purpose and evolution of the IOSCO). Originally, the members of the
predecessor to IOSCO were a set of Western Hemisphere securities regulators. See IOSCO,
IOSCO
Historical
Background
(2009),
online
at
http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=history (visited Nov 21, 2009).
IOSCO,
Objectives
and Princebles of Securities Regulation
1
(2003),
online
at
http://www.iosco.org/ibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (noting
that the above principles are listed in the preamble of the IOSCO by-laws).
OICV-IOSCO, Membership Lists, online at http://www.iosco.org/lists/displaymembers.cfm?
memid=1; http://www.iosco.org/lists/display-members.cfm?memID=3&orderBy=Jurisdiction;
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display-members.cfm?memID=2&orderBy=Jurisdiction
(visited
Nov 21, 2009) (listing 110 ordinary members, eleven associate members, and seventy-three
affiliate members).

Winter 2010

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

fifteen public documents, including reports on sound practices and statements
of principles of supervision.23 It also issues an annual report, sells records of
some of the sessions of its annual conference, and catalogs press releases,
memoranda of understanding, and IOSCO resolutions in its online library.24
Most of these principles were developed in IOSCO's Technical
Committee, which is where the sort of regulatory action most comparable to
that of the Basel Committee may be found.25 Like the Basel Committee, the
Technical Committee is limited in membership
to financial regulators of the
26
systems.
financial
world's most advanced
Moreover, some of these networks really appeared to matter-particularly
those involved in the financial crisis. Although the Basel Committee avows that
it "does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and its
conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have legal force,"2 creations
such as the second Basel Capital Accord functioned as though they had great
weight. Observers have contended that despite its informal legal status, the
Committee's agreements are "considered to be binding on its members. 2 8
IOSCO has made similar claims about its big achievement, the Memorandum of

23

See

24

OICV-IOSCO, Libragy of Public Documents-Documents Published in 2002, online at
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=pubdocs&year=2002 (visited Nov 21, 2009)
(listing the fifteen public documents produced by the IOSCO in 2002).
See OICV-1OSCO, Libragy of Public Documents, online at http://www.iosco.org/library/i

25

ndex.cfm?whereami=library (visited Nov 21, 2009). As of this writing, the organization lists
approximately twenty-five resolutions and 300 other public documents in its online library.
A.A. Somer, for example, interviewed a number of leading officials in the SEC, and concluded

26

that "[t]he committee which might be said to do the 'grunt work' with respect to the most
developed markets is the Technical Committee." A.A. Somer, Jr, IOSCO: Its Mission and
Achievement, 17 NWJ Intl L & Bus 15, 18 (1995).
IOSCO's Technical Committee has nineteen members, while the Basel Committee was, until
recently, limited to regulators from twelve countries; the membership has just been expanded to
include members from all countries of the G20, plus those from several other major economies.
IOSCO, Members of the Technical Committee (2009), online at http://www.iosco.org/lists/
display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (visited Nov 21, 2009); BIS, Histogy of the Basel Committee (cited

in note 16).
27

See BIS, History of the Basel Committee (cited in note 16). Instead, it "reports to the central bank

28

Governors of the Group of Ten countries and Heads of Supervision of its member countries ....
It seeks their endorsement for its major initiatives."
Charles Freeland, The Work of the Basle Committee, in Robert C. Effros, ed, 2 Current Legal Issues
Affecting Central Banks 231, 233 (IMF May 1994). Former Basel Committee member Andrew
Crockett, General Manager of the BIS and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, similarly
concluded that even though Basel Committee recommendations "have no legal force," they have
been "applied in all countries represented on the Committee" and "almost universally applied in
non-member countries." Andrew Crockett, International Standard Setting in Financial Supervision,
Lecture at the Cass Business School, City University, London (Feb 5, 2003), online at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp030205.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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Understanding on Enforcement (MOU), described as "the first global
multilateral information-sharing arrangement among securities regulators,"
which "sets a new international benchmark for cooperation critical to combating
violations of securities and derivatives laws." 29 In 2005, IOSCO resolved "to
require all members to become signatories to the IOSCO MOU, or to commit
to doing so, by 1 January 2010,"" 0 and has continually worked towards this
goal.31 IOSCO states that its mandatory participation
requirements "reflect[the]
32
belief that the IOSCO MOU is critically important."
One of the testaments to the effectiveness of the Basel Committee lies in
the blame that is being laid at the feet of its second capital accord. The first
financial institutions to fail in the crisis were, at least in the view of the SEC,
adequately capitalized under Basel II up to the moment they failed. This was the
case for both Bear Stearns, 33 which collapsed in the spring of 2008, and Lehman
Brothers,34 which fell that autumn. There is no question that Basel I1will bc
reevaluated sooner than later, but perhaps one lesson of the crisis is not that a
regulatory network failed, but rather that a regulatory network made a difference.
It was the Basel Committee that set the standards that Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and the big European banks met in practice, and it was Basel II that
did not, in the end, sufficiently keep the banks solvent.
Basel's role in felling America's big five investment banks may suggest that
international regulatory networks are important, but the current crisis has raised
real questions about their (and Basel's) usefulness. We might expect that these
global processes would be the situs of a global response to the capital

29

US Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), SEC Announces IOSCO Unveiling of Multilateral
Agreement on Enforcement Cooperation (Oct 31,
news/press/2003-145.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).

2003),

online

at

http://www.sec.gov/

31

IOSCO, 2005 Annual Report 2 (2005), online at http://www.iosco.org/annuaLreports/
annuaLreport 2005/pdf/AnnualReport_05.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
"The organisation considered recent developments among the membership in taking up the

32

MOU including the progress being made as IOSCO seeks to meet the 2010 deadline by which
members are required to become signatories." IOSCO Update: Issue 6, May 2007 at 1, online at
http://www.iosco.org/library/newsletters/pdf/IOSCOUpdateMay.2007.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009).
IOSCO, 2005 Annual Report at 3 (cited in note 30).

30

33

34

See Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Letter to Basel Committee in Support of New
Guidance on Liquidiy Management (Mar 20, 2008), online at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/200848.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (stating that Bear Stearns met supervisory standards and that lack
of confidence, not capital, caused the firm's demise).
See US Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement Regarding Recent Market Events and Lehman
Brothers (Sep 14, 2008), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-197.htm (visited
Nov 21, 2009) (discussing SEC attempts to insulate Lehman Brothers from the economic shocks
and continuing to enforce SEC net capital and consumer asset protection rules).
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inadequacy of banks, or the freezing up of various credit markets. They were,
after all, begun in the wake of financial crises. Both Basel and 1OSCO have
devised principles of regulatory supervision and processes of cooperation among
supervisors designed to interdict global panics before they start.
But networks have had little to say about the current crisis. Indeed, they
have not even been responsible for the few coordinated international legal
responses by domestic financial regulators that we have seen. For example,
during the crisis the SEC implemented a short-lived ban on the shorting of
financial stocks. It coordinated that ban with the securities regimes of other
countries, including Great Britain, Australia, Taiwan, and Pakistan.35 But 1OSCO
was not the vehicle for the shorting ban. The organization has had little to say
about the financial crisis in any respect, other than a May 2008 suggestion that
its members peruse some recommendations about the subprime mortgage crisis,
36
the precursor to the market crashes.
As for the Basel Committee, its efforts to solve the increasing
internationalization of the banking crisis have not sent every central banker
bolting to Switzerland (at least not as far as we know-the Committee operates
in secret).37 It, like IOSCO, has so far responded to the crisis with small beer,
such as a speech by the committee chair on "The Importance of Banking
Supervision in Financial Stability."3 And the coordinated injections of funds
into the monetary supply by the central banks beginning in the fall of 2008which was at least an example of regulatory cooperation-is not obviously
35

36

37

38

See, for example, Canadian Regulators Implement Short-Selling Ban, Reuters (Sep 21, 2008), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/govemmentFilingsNews/idUSN1925996220080919
(visited
Nov 21, 2009) (stating that Canada would follow the United States, Britain, and other countries,
and temporarily ban the short-selling of certain financial stocks).
JOSCO Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Report
on the Subprime Crisis-FinalReport 11 (May 2008), online at http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (giving recommendations for future
1OSCO work, after a discussion on the major economic issues).
See Joseph Jude Norton, Devising InternationalBank Supervisoy Standards177 (Graham & Trotman
1995) (noting the Basel Committee has tried to maintain a low profile); Huib J. Muller, Address to
the 5th International Conference of Bank Supervisors (May 16, 1988), quoted in Porter, States, Markets,
and Regimes at 66 (cited in note 18) (discussing the hidden nature of Basel supervision).
President of the Netherlands Bank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Nout Wellink, Keynote Address at the FSI-EMEAP High Level Meeting on Bank
Supervision: The Importance of Banking Supervision in Financial Stability (Nov 21, 2008), online
at http://www.bis.org/review/r081117a.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (discussing the Basel
Committee's response to the financial crisis). To be fair, Basel also promulgated some supervisory
principles, albeit rather unspecific ones, designed to deal with liquidity risk. See BIS, Press
Release-Global Bank Supervisors Endorse Strengthened Sound Practice Standards for Liquidity
Risk
Management
and
Supervision
(Sep
25,
2008),
online
at
http://www.bis.org/press/p080925.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (listing principles a bank should
follow to establish a robust liquidity risk management framework).
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linked to the Basel, even though Basel, with its regular meetings, seems a likely
outlet for such coordination.3 9
Any defense of networks like IOSCO and the Basel Committee
accordingly turns on their admittedly less quantifiable contributions. Both
organizations were founded in 1974, and it is possible that over three decades of
cooperation among central bankers and securities regulators has contributed to
the capacity for the coordinated response that we have seen, to the degree that
we have seen it. Indeed it is rumored to be so. It may be, for example, that the
SEC coordinated its shorting ban with its international counterparts at an
IOSCO meeting, even though the coordination was done in the hallways rather
than during the official session. And it could be that the coordination of the
injections of capital by the world's central bankers was facilitated by their already
extant supervisory cooperation. In other words, perhaps regulatory networks
created the relationships that have facilitated the international responses to the
crisis.
But perhaps the size and scope of the crisis reveals the weakness of
networks rather than their hidden contributions. The international governance
mechanism that appears to be making policy is the G20, and such policymaking
is the opposite of international law. The G20 is better understood as a Concert
of Europe for a new era. Like the Concert, it embodies the classic international
relations paradigm of heads of state making international policy for their
subjects, and it is somewhat antithetical to the technocratic expertise that
networks try to represent. Moreover, it appears that networks are working for
the G20, rather than guiding it or offering a de-politicized alternative-taskspecific, technocratic harmonization by experts.
For example, the G20 just renamed and promised to reform the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF), a body meant to coordinate the work of IOSCO and the
Basel Committee. 40 The FSF was designed "to ensure that national and
international authorities and relevant international supervisory bodies and expert
39

See, for example, Matthew Saltmarsh and Keith Bradsher, Fed Offers $180 Billion for Ailing Money
Markets, NY Times Al (Sept 18, 2008) (stating that the Federal Reserve and other central banks
were making money available to their financial systems).

4

See G20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform 3,
15 (Apr 2, 2009), online at
http://www.londonsumrit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/final-communique (visited Nov 21, 2009)
(renaming the FSF the "Financial Stability Board" and agreeing to give it a stronger mandate).
The Board is run, in somewhat surprising personal capacity, by the chairman of a multinational
state-owned bank. See Zaring, 5 Chi J Intl L at 588 (cited in note 14) (stating that the General
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements was appointed Chairman of the FSF in a
personal capacity). For more about the original decision to convene a Financial Stability Forum,

see Financial Action Task Force, Communiqui of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
(Feb 20, 1999), online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/rr2964.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009)
(discussing steps by the G7 to build the FSF and coordinate between relevant agencies).
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groupings can more effectively foster and coordinate their respective
responsibilities to promote international financial stability, improve the
functioning of the markets and reduce systemic risk."'" It meets biannually and
currently consists of twenty-six national regulatory agencies, including the
networks of banking supervisors and securities regulators (the Basel Committee
and IOSCO). 42 The FSF has been run by the General Manager of the Bank for
International Settlements, who was appointed Chairman of the FSF in a
personal capacity.4 3
The G20 recently enlarged the FSF, renamed it the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), and called for it to be remade as a stronger, better consolidated
entity. Time will tell if a network-even a network of networks-is even capable
of playing that role effectively. But the events surrounding the expansion are
significant. At the G20's behest, the Basel Committee has expanded its
membership to include the G20 members. This expansion had long been sought
by countries of the developing world, and Basel had always resisted. So perhaps
it is indicative of the network's crisis response to note that the chief
accomplishment of Basel during the crisis has been to look more like the G20, at
the instigation of the G20.
III. TREATIES
If the informal instruments of international law have disappointed during
the crisis, they have not, however, actively countermanded efforts to respond to
it. The WTO-conventionally thought to be an effective treaty-created
international organization and one with a claim on financial regulation 44arguably has. The WTO has had, at its core, an effective, complied-with
adjudication process. During the five year period between 1995 and 2000,
defendants who lost before the WTO "complied fully 73% of the time and
complied either fully or partially 88% of the time," according to Eric Posner and

41

See Financial Action Task Force, Communiqu (cited in note 40) (reciting the purpose of the FSF).

42

Financial Stability Board, Mandate (cited in note 40).

43

Hans Tietmeyer, InternationalCooperation and Coordination in the Area of FinandalMarket Supervision
and Surveillance 7 (Feb 11, 1999), online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r-9902.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (advising that "[t]he chairperson [of the FSF] should be
appointed in a personal capacity for a period of time which is adequate to ensure continuity in the
work of the Forum" and recommending Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the BIS to the
position).
The WTO was founded as part of a system meant to ensure stability both in trade and in finance,
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, ratified in 1994, makes provision for trade in
financial services.
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John Yoo. 45 Other scholars have included the WTO Appellate Body as a prime
example of the potential effectiveness of international tribunals.4 6 But it also has
the institution of the Secretariat and the ambassadors to the organizations, who
meet regularly to devise standards for trade relations and to take a forwardlooking view of the international economy.
It is accordingly unfortunate that the treaty will either prevent countries
from reaching the political compromises necessary to stimulate their economies,
or that it will be ignored. At best, the WTO will find its performance during the
early part of the crisis a lost opportunity to further the collaboration that, in
addition to workable dispute resolution, has been one of it signal achievements.
At worst, its disciplines will be undercut by countries that ignore it as they
attempt to stimulate their economies.
It is worth noting that the WTO was created, at least initially, in the
Bretton Woods process designed to stabilize the global economy. As such, the
WTO may seem like the natural institutional choice for economic intervention.
It began as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but in 1994
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was ratified, and that
treaty includes provisions to regulate services, including financial services.
Moreover, the WTO has the administrative capacity to respond to economic
crisis. Ambassadors of every country that have joined the treaty (including the
vast majority of the world's countries and most of its economic production) are
available in Geneva to negotiate and coordinate responses to shocks. In short, it
was not impossible for the WTO to contribute to a global response to the
financial crisis. It had the capacity to coordinate one.
Unfortunately, the WTO has done none of those things. Instead, the WTO
stands as a barrier to the approaches most countries have adopted in response to
the crisis and, as far as can be discerned, has not even been considered a vehicle
for a proactive response to the crisis. The failure of the WTO to offer a vehicle
to respond to the crisis illustrates, I suspect, the failure of the Bretton Woods
vision of global administrative processes capable of responding to
macroeconomic shocks.
For example, consider the various bailouts of the banking and automobile
industries. They have formed the principal response of every prosperous nation
to the crisis. But they probably violate the Agreement on Subsidies and

45

Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal L Rev 1, 48
(2005) (discussing compliance rates between with the WTO adjudication mechanism between

1995 and 2000).
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See, for example, William Davey, The WTO: Looking Forwards,9 J Intl
Econ L 3, 20 (2006)_("[T]he
WTO dispute settlement system stands as an example of an effective international tribunal with
independent adjudicators.").
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Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), an annex to the WTO agreement.
The other common response in developed nations, a Keynesian stimulus, at least
as enacted in the US, contains a "buy local" provision which48 while likely
politically necessary is flatly inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.

The legal analysis is straightforward. The WTO law on subsidies governs
any "financial contribution," made "by or at the direction of a government or
any public body within the territory of a Member."49 Loans and guarantees for
the auto industry and banks, which come, at least in the case of the US, from
congressional appropriations administered by the Treasury Department, meet
this definition. The financial contribution must "confer a benefit" to the
domestic recipients, and here, because the market would not provide the money
the government has offered to the recipients at the interest rate offered by the
government, this test is met.5 °Also, the contribution must be to a defined group
under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. This is designed to prevent universal
health care or primary education from being characterized as an illegal subsidy.
The industry sectors receiving bailouts do appear to be defined narrowly-at
least in comparison to universal health care. They are particular financial
institutions and auto companies, identified on a company-by-company basis.
The subsidies must present "a threat of serious prejudice" to the
expectations of other members of the WTO, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the SCM
Agreement.51 "Serious prejudice" is a slippery term, but it is certainly plausible
that a subsidy designed to allow domestic firms to charge below cost prices and
yet remain afloat would be deemed to meet this test. Nor is it a defense to argue,
as the auto industry did, that "everyone is subsidizing."5 2 It is true that some of
the money given to domestic financial institutions has been passed along to
foreign financial institutions. This has been the case with AIG, the failed
insurance company, which has posted much of the funding it has received from
47

48

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("SCM Agreement"), Annex
1A, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Apr 15, 1994), 1867 UN Treaty Ser
14.
Other countries have instituted their own "buy local" provisions, so the issue is not solely one for
American trade lawyers to worry about.
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SCM Agreement, Art 1.1 (cited in note 47).
Id. Perhaps one saving grace for the financial industry bailouts is that, although the money first
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went to the balance sheets of a variety of domestic institutions, it has frequently since been passed
on to foreign financial institutions.
SCM Agreement, Art 6.2 (cited in note 47).
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Claire Brunel and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Money for the Auto Industy: Consistent with the WITO Rules?
at 7 (Peterson Inst for Intl Econ Feb 2009), online at http://www.iie.com/publications/
pb/pb09-4.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) ("If a WTO member that exports cars to the United States
brings a case, it will be no defense, in legal terms, for the United States to assert that the member
state in question also subsidizes its auto industry.').
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the government as collateral for credit default swap contracts, many of which
have been concluded with foreign banks.
The stimulus package, at least in its American variant, presents an even
more flatly inconsistent contrast with the disciplines of the SCM Agreement, at
least if not waived. Section 1605 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (ARRA), unless waived, requires that all of the iron, steel and
"manufactured goods" used in ARRA-funded projects for construction,
alteration, maintenance or repair of "a public building or public work" be
"produced in the United States., 53 Article 3 of the SCM Agreement provides
that domestic sourcing requirements as a condition of receipt of a subsidy are
per se illegal.54 Despite these problems, countries have continued to subsidize
their banks and auto industries. As of this writing, no case disputing the subsidy
has been filed before the WTO.
The result is that since the advent of the financial crisis, two things have
not happened, both of which do not reflect well on the WTO's agency capability
to respond to emergencies. First, there has been no hint of a proactive role in
contributing to the crisis response from the organization. Second, the
contribution it could make (a debatable contribution, but one that would
presumably strengthen international governance), that is, forbidding countries
from violating their trade obligations, also does not yet appear to be happening
(though it is early for a final judgment).
To be sure, the WTO process itself has some provisions that permit
exceptions to the discipline of trade law. For example, there is the rarely
successful invocation of safeguards pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT,
which permits countries to suspend their trade obligations where imports
unexpectedly "cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that
territory of like or directly competitive products."55 And there is no requirement
that countries bring claims before the WTO, even when there are claims that are
easy to make. Indeed, there is some history of countries explicitly deciding not
to challenge some trade restrictions through informal agreements throughout
the course of the GATT.
However, unenforced legal obligations at some point cease being law, and
start being something else. The WTO's failure to matter, either as a constructive
solution or as a trade discipline, may mean that, at truly crucial turns for the

53

54
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American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ("ARRA'", Pub L No 111-5, § 1605, 123 Stat

115 (2009).
SCM Agreement, Art 3 (cited in note 49).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), Art XIX(1)(a), 61 Stat A-11, 55 UN Treaty Ser
194.
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global economy, it devolves into a treaty observed in the breach, instead of an
asset that could facilitate a global response.
IV. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
International financial institutions have never fulfilled the more optimistic
hopes vested in them after the Bretton Woods process following the Second
World War. They have, however, evolved to be principal vehicles for developed
countries to provide funds to developing countries and principal vehicles for
those countries to impose the so-called Washington Consensus of relatively free
internal markets, privatization, and investor protection on the rest of the world.
It is in this role that the IMF, in particular, has prospered during the crisis.
The commitments made by the G20 suggest that the IMF is to be the lender of
last resort to developing countries that run into financial problems, even if the
crises originate in developed countries and infect internationally from a locus of
prosperity. This firmed-up new role as lender of last resort, and thus, arguably,
as central banker to the developing world, is important-especially if it lasts. But
it is a modest accomplishment, and arguably a smaller one than its founders had
in mind.
The IMF, which has always been managed by a European and chaired by
an American, is in theory a specialized agency of the UN, though it has its own
charter, finances, and governing structure.56 It is funded by quotas from its
members, who receive voting rights commensurate with their contributions.
This makes the US, the largest contributor to the IMF, its largest vote-holder
7
with 17.09 percent of the electorate.1
The IMF has described its work as threefold. First, it is supposed to
perform a surveillance function-to watch and warn about potential shocks that
could be confronted by the global economy or any of its members. As Joseph
Norton has put it, this surveillance role has expanded from one that "under its
Bretton Woods I mandate pursuant to Article IV of the IMF's articles was rather
narrow and limited to macroeconomic matters and monetary matters, such as
balance of payments and exchange rate issues" to one that "has expanded into
the financial sector and financial crisis prevention areas." 58
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IMF, Oveniew, online at http://www.imf.org/external/about/overview.htm

(visited Nov 21,

2009) (providing a general overview of the IMF).
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IMF, Members' Quotas and Voting Powers, and IMF Board of Governors, online at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#u (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Joseph Jude Norton, Comment On The Developing TransnationalNetwork(s) In The Area Of International
FinancialRegulation: The Underinnings Of A New Bretton Woods Ii Global FinancialSystem Framework,
43 Inl Law 175, 188 (2009).
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The IMF's other two activities are to provide technical assistance for
developing countries and to lend to those countries that, as the IMF puts it,
"have trouble meeting their international payments and cannot otherwise find
sufficient financing on affordable terms." 9 However, these loans come at a
cost-borrower countries must meet IMF conditions, which have become
known as the Washington Consensus. That consensus tends to require adoption
of open markets, liberalization of capital flows, and governance reforms.6" In
short, "[t]he fund pools the financial resources of richer nations to provide
short-term assistance to countries that cannot pay their debts. In return for their
loans, borrowers promise to take corrective actions that can cause economic
pain," as the New York Times observed in 1996.61 Although the Fund now
suggests that it does not follow the Consensus slavishly, it has conditioned its
assistance on the acceptance and adoption of standards of codes of good
practice in governance that would seem to mirror the Consensus. This includes
the adoption of such codes as the OECD's Principles of Corporate
Governance62 and IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,63
64
both of which have been embraced by the IMF as "important for [its] work."
These development goals are limited ones. Since its founding, the IMF has
assisted with reconstruction and development, but there were also intimations
that it might do something more. Indeed, the IMF was created with the potential
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IMF, Our Work, online at http://www.imf.org/externa1/about/ourwork.htm (visited Nov 21,
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to serve as the world's central bank, the lender of last resort to bankrupt
sovereigns of any size. The IMF's articles of incorporation provide that one of
its purposes is "[t]o give confidence to members by making the general
resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate
safeguards." 65 It has, throughout its existence, performed some of the more
minor macroeconomic research duties of a central bank, such as monitoring
global exchange rates and capital flows.
But the IMF has never had the resources to deal with a truly global crisis
that might affect one of its wealthy members. Instead, its last resort lending has
gone to developing countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia.
Moreover, its capacity to deal with theses crises has only declined over time.
During the last decade, dissatisfaction with the IMF led large borrowers, like
Brazil and Argentina, to pay off their IMF obligations in full.66 The result, as
Mitu Gulati and George Triantis have observed, was to "thereby, in effect, cut
off the assurance that these programs might have provided to investors that the
IMF would be involved" in dealing with their debt, suggesting both that
borrowers had become fed up with the IMF's involvement and also that lenders
were no longer willing to insist on it.67 As a result, Anna Gelpern has argued,
"[t]he old official creditors . . . such as the IMF ... are receding in importance,
thanks to prepayments by middle-income countries and debt relief for the
poorest."'6 8
To be clear, the IMF's achievements are a bright spot in a bad half-decade
for the institution. IMF lending peaked in 2003; its credit outstanding reached
$110.29 billion.69 By September 30, 2008, outstanding IMF loans had decreased
to $17.72 billion.70 The decrease in demand for IMF's lending (and the
consequential decrease the interest the IMF received) led to a 2007 budget
deficit and drove the outfit to seek authorization from national legislatures to
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use its gold reserves to finance the institution. It appears to have been granted
that authority by the G20 meeting in April 2009.71
It is hard to know exactly what to make of the recent entrustment of $750
billion by the G20 to the fund, but it underscores how the IMF, rather than
being an important standalone form of global governance, now has become a
conduit for aid from prosperous countries to poor ones. It also emphasizes the
primacy of the G20 in setting the policy agenda and the very capacity of the
IMF.
Amid all the good news, it is worth noting that the role the G20 envisions
for the IMF-a role where it provides bailout money for developing countries
infected by financial crises-is a narrow one. Moreover, it is a role different than
the one envisioned for the IMF when it was founded after the Second World
War. Then, the IMF was supposed to more broadly serve as something like a
central banker to the world, both developed and developing. it was designed to
provide international market stability as well as to backstop governments that
found themselves in macroeconomic or budgetary crises.
Even with its new resources, there is no prospect that the IMF could come
to the aid of more than one member of the G20 (with the possible exception of,
say, South Africa and Argentina, whose very membership in the G20 is
somewhat controversial), were such a member in crisis. The IMF cannot bail out
Europe, it cannot bail out the US, and it cannot bail out Japan or China. So
rather than being part of the architecture of global finance, perhaps the IMF is
better thought of as a sentry before the architecture, and a part of a different
construction: the architecture of global development.
V. THE G20
The G20 did not begin as a Concert of Europe. Its ambitions were mild
and focused on either simple networking, or perhaps on preventing financial
crises such as the one in 1974 that prompted the formation of the Basel
Committee and IOSCO. But over the course of the crisis, it-a purely political
and not at all legal or technocratic institution-has come to be the basis of the
initial policymaking response to the crisis that we have seen at a global level. The
increasing importance of the G20 is something of a rebuke to the capacity of
international legal institutions, rather than a complement to them. A detailed
discussion of the G-level process is illustrative of this.
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The original participants in the G-level process included the six largest
economies in the non-communist world-the US, Japan, Germany, France, the
UK, and Italy. 2 Founded in 1975, when French President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing invited leaders of these countries to a so-called "Rambouillet Summit,"
the initial goal of the G-level meetings was to create an environment in which
leaders could meet, but at which national security would not be discussed. 3
Canada oined as the seventh member in 1976, at the group's Puerto Rico
meeting.
G-level summits followed regularly, but much of the work for these
summits appeared to be done by the Treasury ministries and banking
supervisors below the G7 level. By contrast, the heads of state spent time, at
least as Peter Hajnal and John J. Kirton report, on getting to know one another
and creating relations designed to withstand international crises.7" The G7's
initial accomplishments were unexciting in a typical international fashion: there
were agreements on closer cooperation, paeans to democratization, and
nostrums supporting the expansion of multilateral trade in an effort to restore
economic and financial stability. Notably missing were agreements on
macroeconomic policies, and the difficult work of preventing global banking or
stock market panics were delegated to the network regulators.7 6
Nonetheless, Hajnal and Kirton see the story of the G-level meetings as
one of ever increasing momentum. The meetings expanded to deal with more
and more issues, beginning with macroeconomic policy, trade, and monetary
policy, and expanding in the 1980s to address highly political issues including
Israel and arms control. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union,
72
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the G7 added China and Russia policy to its mix. Later in the 1990s it decided to
invite Russia as a member, creating the G8.77
The summit remit mandates over this period tell the story of politicization
and, at the same time, suggest its limits. "We will continue our dialogue with our
African partners. At our next Summit, we will review progress on the
implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from
our Personal Representatives for Africa," announced the chair at the end of one
summit. 78 In another remit mandate, the members committed themselves to a

nuclear safety program: "With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners
agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of
our next Summit." 79 But the G-level groups have never done much since to deal°
with nonproliferation. The number of these mandates appeared to increase,9
but their value was much less obvious.
it was never clear how much work the G-level process was doing on these
matters of high politics. With the emergence of a hegemonic system at the end
of the twentieth century, where the US perceived little value in high level
international consultation, the political and military efforts of the organization
began to make it look more like a mere talking shop. Accordingly, the
organization foundered during the decade as the US began to see it as less
critical, but with the Asian and Russian financial crises, its original, non-security
raison d'etre came back to the fore." l It also expanded its membership to include
the twenty countries that are part of it today.
In 1997, the summit founded the FSF, which was designed to coordinate
the work of the Basel Committee and its corollaries in insurance and securities
regulation, and included the IMF and World Bank as members. As financial
shocks to the global economy began to come from non-western locales, the
members of the G8 saw the expansion of the membership to include countries
that could represent the interests of the developing world as essential.82 Hence
the expansion to twenty members. (It has never been clear why Argentina and
Australia were entitled to membership, but both were invited, perhaps because
77
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American regulators thought they might be supportive votes.) Although the
expansion was done rather casually, the implications of the expansion were farreaching. Since expansion, the G20 has met annually, always reported some
progress, and, if measured by commitments announced at the conclusion of the
summits, has had two important meetings (Ottawa in 2001 and Berlin in 2004)
and five minor ones.83 Berlin 2004 and Ottawa comprised sixty-six of the
organization's ninety-four total commitments, some verging on the anodyne,
others less so, between 1999 and 2005.84
However, the development of the G20 has had little to do with law.
Throughout this period, the enterprise has had no legal status; it was never
formalized by a treaty, and the group has never promulgated or announced
bylaws or rules for decision making. It has no administrative agency and has not
created a secretariat or bureaucracy. Rather, it has remained a politicized
organization of heads of states representing their countries' interests in an atwill, discretionary environment. The G8 (and G20) has identified itself as a
"consultation procedure" and not as an "international organization." 85 As the
G8 said in its 2003 summit website, "[T]he G8 is just one club for discussion
and co-operation among many others." Thus, "[t]he G8's powers and
uniqueness should not be overestimated." 86
In short, although the G20 may be a regime," in that it arranges "sets of
governing arrangements" that include "networks of rules, norms, and
procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects,"88 it was never a
regime invested with any of the trappings of legal formality, or even quasi-legal
network-like status. Instead, it represented international cooperation in is most
realist manifestation-heads of states collaborating on behalf of their countries,
untrammeled by process. The heads of state have entertained contributions from
outsiders on occasion, but that has also been an at-will process, and the
contributions have not come from technocratic experts.
For example, sometimes the G20 has entertained advice from the OECD
meetings conducted before the summits, which has permitted other wealthy
countries to play a role. The G20 has heard reports from subordinate

83

Ella Kokotsis, G20 Commitments 1999-2005 1, online at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/
analysis/g20commitments.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (counting the number of commitments each
meeting and listing the commitments).

84

See id.

85

The G8, Questions about the G8, online at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/the-g8/

86

questionsabout the-g8.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Id (answering whether the G-8 is the world's management board).

87

See Stephen Krasner, InternationalRegimes 1, § 5 (Cornell 1983).

88

Robert D. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Powerand Interdependence 19 (Little, Brown 1977).

Vol. 10 No. 2

InternationalInstitutionalPerformancein Crisis

Zating

mechanisms like the FSF/FSB, finance ministries, and central banks.8 9 But it has
never obligated itself to those recommendations, and many have concluded that
the FSF played at best a small role in formulating what little G20 procedure has
been relevant in globalizing financial regulation. In the 2000 meeting and
thereafter, NGOs and international businesses have been invited to attend, in a
limited way, the meetings.9"
Nicolas Bayne has tried to organize this essentially ad hoc process through
the language of Weberian bureaucratic rationality, where the discretion of the
organization has been cabined by a series of pre-meetings and low-level
contacts.91 Whether the G20 deliberation process is bureaucratic or diplomatic
in character is mostly a matter of emphasis, in light of the ad hoc, noninstitutionalized nature of the G-level process. Still, it is always worth noting just
how constrained mere international politics are. As with other purely political
summits, much of the spade work before the G20 is not done by diplomats, but
rather by bureaucrats.
The G20 meetings, after all, do not include finance ministers. Within the
finance ministries, "sherpas" have guided the G20 agenda through a series of
pre-meetings and, in the time-honored format of international summits, a good
92
part of the agenda is all but completed by the time the heads of state meet.
This means that an important part of what heads of state do is to put their
imprimatur on the process and establish to their own and their observers'
satisfaction that the meeting was worth having.
The extra-legal nature of the G20 is also reflected in the way that it has
institutionalized enforcement of its communiques. It has created no such
mechanism. As Guido Garavoglia and Pier Carolo Padoan have concluded, the
inability of the organization to coerce its members to implement any
coordinated policy means that those policies depend on "credible" mutual
commitments. 93 In their view, the G20 is at its most effective when it is
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establishing institutions such as the European Bank of Reconstruction, 94since
such long-term investment makes their policy commitments more credible.
All of this is meant to suggest that the G-level process is, and has always
been, a non-legal and not-very-administrative form of governance. And so the
prominent role the G20 has played in formalizing a response to the crisis has
been indicative of the limits of global bureaucratization. While institutions like
the WTO, the Basel Committee, and IOSCO have remained silent, the G20 has
actually contributed to a response. But because of the way the organization
works, it is difficult to characterize this response as administrative, or even
indicative of a global administrative law.
The G-level and ad hoc response to the crisis was outlined as the principals
from the G20 group of countries met to discuss the crisis in November, 2008. 95
At the conclusion of that meeting, they released a statement of relatively low
specificity, but one that nonetheless underscored the global character of the
crisis:
We pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and
risk management, and ensure that all financial markets, products and
participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their
circumstances. We will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies,
consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of conduct.
We will also make regulatory regimes more effective over the economic
cycle, while ensuring that regulation is efficient, does not stifle innovation,
and encourages expanded trade in financial products and services.96 We
commit to transparent assessments of our national regulatory systems.
The statement's relatively vague quality is par for the course, but it clearly
indicates that the G20 intends to formulate a policy response to the financial
crisis. In this way the statement is notable for the signal it sent about the global
nature of the crisis rather than for specific regulatory reforms agreed to.
Moreover, the action plan that followed the agreement on principles was more
substantive in some cases. The G20 recommended to the IMF what was
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essentially a to-do list, which looked like an agreement on credit default swap
regulation:
Supervisors and regulators, building on the imminent launch of central
counterparty services for credit default swaps (CDS) in some countries,
should: speed efforts to reduce the systemic risks of CDS and over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives transactions; insist that market participants
support exchange traded or electronic trading platforms for CDS contracts;
expand OTC derivatives market transparency; and ensure that the
97
infrastructure for OTC derivatives can support growing volumes.
In April, the G20 met again, assessed its performance since the November
meeting, and announced an army of new initiatives. It announced that it would
strengthen the IMF, and give the FSF, which it broadened and claimed would
get more teeth as the FSB, a broader mandate to consider global systemic
stability.
VI. CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS
What should we make of the failure of the non-G20 international
institutions? What does the response of these international institutions tell us
about governance in an emergency? Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule are
presumably unsurprised; they believe that law gives way to emergency.98 They
invoke Carl Schmitt-the Weimar philosopher who believed that the
explanation for legislative and democratic failure lies in emergencies-where
commanding executives take control and respond to the crisis in an ever more
democracy-threatening way.99 As I have noted, disbelievers in the hard and soft
variants of international law are unlikely to revisit their skepticism now.
Alternatively, it could be that international law may discipline, as the WTO has
done with trade barriers and the Basel Committee has done with capital
adequacy, better than it encourages coordination and creative response or induce
compliance with discipline during crises.
Despite the failures of global administration, it is not clear that the
Schmittian analysis makes sense in every context. During both 9/11 and the
financial crisis, the executive branch of the US government announced a number
of controversial new programs. For the most part, Congress got out of the way,

97
98

99

Id.
Consider Posner and Vermeule, Crisis Governance (cited in note 2) (discussing the inability of the
legislature and the courts to respond to emergency situations and having to delegate broad power
to the executive branch); see also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administralive Law, 122 Harv L
Rev 1095, 1096 (2009) ("Legal black holes and grey holes are best understood by drawing upon
the thought of Carl Schmitt, in particular his account of the relationship between legality and
emergencies.").
Consider Carl Schmitt, trans Ellen Kennedy, The Crisis of ParliamentaryDemocray (MIT 1985).

Winter 2010

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

providing broad authorizations for executive response replete with discretion
and limitations on oversight. Posner and Vermeule, would put this down to the
Schmittian inevitability of executive decisiveness overruling legislative indecision
in emergencies. 0
In fact, the principal vehicles of the domestic response to the financial
crisis so far-the Treasury and the Federal Reserve-played those roles partly
because of the flexible legal authority both enjoyed which other institutions did
not. And while the bailout, as done by Congress, certainly bequeathed an
awesome amount of power on the government, the details of the grant changed
substantially between the initial three-page proposal by the government and the
41 2 -page bill that passed the legislature. 1 '
The international cognate appears to be similar to the American response
but with more dire consequences for those committed to the prospect of
international governance. The international institution most flexibly positioned
to respond to the crisis, as I have said, appears to be the G20, and it is
something of a mystery that the network-which enjoys no limits on the ambit
of its authority and yet has specifically been charged with responding to financial
crises and panics-did not play a role in the response.
The financial crisis has more implications for global administrative law, in
that it presents something of a challenge to the very project. Bureaucratization
has had little to say about the crisis. It has not provided a response through the
usual international vehicles, and the cosmopolitan comparative (and, of course,
harmonizing) mission of the networks has been found to be wanting. Instead,
the response to that crisis has been politicized through the G20, and although
there may be hope for more law-like institutionalization (and indeed, there may
be a Bretton Woods 3 if the French president has his way), 1 2 that
institutionalization has neither happened nor offered a response to the crisis.
Even those skeptical of market interventions by governments should
hesitate to embrace their failure here. For one thing, before the crisis
governments appeared to be attracted to the coordination of financial regulation.
In a testament to David Mitrany's classical view that international cooperation
would lead to international enmeshment, American regulators have participated
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in international regulatory networks and in treaties like the WTO, vigorously and
increasingly.
Much of this was driven by seeming need. To take just one example,
American gross trading activity in foreign securities is 7.5 trillion dollars, up
from 53 billion dollars three decades ago. 10 3 Approximately two-thirds of
American investors own securities of non-US companies-a 30 percent increase
from just five years ago. 4 And foreign trading activity in US securities now
amounts to over 33 trillion dollars.' Recently, globalization has been blamed
for the exposure of a number of European financial institutions to securitized
American subprime mortgages and for a variety of American banks that failed
because they retained those mortgages on their balance sheets.
For these reasons, the SEC's international affairs office has quickly become
a central outfit for the formulation of regulatory policy.0 6 Its employees spend
thirty percent of their time on what SEC Director Ethiopis Tafarris calls
"international regulatory policy," or, in other words, "representing [the] agency
in international organizations that are developing principles, standards, papers,
best practices intended to have some application in the securities market," and
"looking at the impact of SEC rulemaking beyond the borders of the United
States and informing and advising the Commission and staff of that impact,
identifying areas where we might be creating some conflict of law, and
10 7
identifying ways to mitigate conflict if at all possible."'
The impact of this globalization on the regulators who oversee American
markets has been enormous. Again, consider the SEC. Instead of exclusively
spending their time in the US, in 2007, the SEC commissioners gave speeches in
Sydney, Madrid, Mumbai, London (four times); Dublin, Berlin, Frankfurt, Paris
(three times); Munich, Luxembourg, Cape Town, Vancouver, Brisbane, and
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Tokyo (three times). 8 Former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox reports that
international work "comprise[d] over half of [his] time and responsibilities."' 0' 9
In his view, "it is no longer possible for the SEC to do its work in the United
States without a truly global strategy . .. [W]hat goes on in other110 markets and
jurisdictions is now intimately bound up with what happens here."
In light of this, some scholars have called for a "New International
Financial Architecture," composed of "international bodies that have their own
mandates," like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and standard setters like IOSCO
and the Basel Committee."' Douglas Amer and Rolf Weber think that this
disparate financial architecture might be organized around its sole goal-to
ensure the stability of the international financial system." 2
So what should we make of the seeming failure of that architecture? Of
course, we should not write off institutions that fail to perform perfectly in
particularly challenging environments. But we might wonder whether the world
has turned away from law and towards politics as the crisis has globalized. What
could make more law-like institutions work better? I suggest that an
improvement in the performance of the international financial regulatory
architecture will require an internalization process, which in turn requires an
increasing degree of confidence in these institutions.
This might only be a partial development at best. As international
governance increasingly is delegated to the particularly informal international
institutions, the problem of enforcement grows even more critical. The
international system is anarchic, meaning that the rules of international
administrative bodies are not easily enforced." 3 The WTO has a dispute
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resolution system generally regarded as successful, but the other putative
administrators of global economic regulation do not. Moreover, it may be that
the WTO's enforcement discipline ends up being ignored in the context of the
crisis, and the lack of enforceability could be correlated across institutional
forms.
It may seem overly constructivist to say so, but difficult-to-enforce
international norms have always required an internationalization of those norms
by domestic administrative agencies charged with giving teeth to these
agreements and accords of international regulators. And that in turn probably
requires some confidence in the effectiveness and wisdom of the international
legal institution. The inability of these institutions to offer solutions to the crisis
will do nothing to develop this process of international norms through
confidence.
Perhaps this confidence might be built through a procedural device: interlinkage. The various networks, IFIs, and the WTO failed to respond to the
systemic risks because they only looked at part of the problem. Perhaps if their
efforts were more coordinated, these problems would have been alleviated.
Although the idea of perfect regulatory anticipation is unlikely, inter-linkage
might make for more effective international governance.
The G20 appears to agree that inter-linkage is important (or it agrees that
purely symbolic measures are the only measures that it can take to deal with
future problems). Hence, it invested in the FSF, now remade as the FSB, with
more members, more powers, and, above all, more coordination.
My argument has been that political, not legal or expert institutions, have
been leading the response to the crisis. Accordingly, in the context of regulatory
reform, which will surely follow the crisis, we might predict that political
responses will take precedence over technocratic or legal ones. The search for
blame is likely to affect international regulatory form. Politicians may focus on
executive compensation and criminal penalties. This focus is in turn likely to
guide global administrative cooperation towards a coordination of enforcement
activities before it leads to cooperation in other areas.
These predictions are not meant to obscure the conclusions drawn here,
which is that international legal institutions have not performed well in the
financial crisis of the past year and that purely political institutions have taken
over the task of coordinating the response. It may be acceptable that a club of
democratically elected, relatively prosperous leaders have assumed this role. But
the response to the crisis is not a vindication of the increasingly elaborate
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institutions designed to deal with the global economy, and, perhaps, preclude
pure politics from stooping to govern the global economy.
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